This is a judgment of the court on the first appeal from a decision of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission ("SIAC"). SIAC was established by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997. The decision of SIAC was given on 7 September 1999. The SIAC allowed an appeal by Mr Shafiq Ur Rehman against the decision of the Secretary of State for the Home Department to refuse his application for indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom and to make a deportation order. In a letter of 9 December 1998, the Secretary of State wrote to the respondent giving his decision in these terms:

"Application for Indefinite Leave to Remain
I am writing with reference to your application for indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom on the basis that you have spent a continuous period of four years in the United Kingdom as a Minister of Religion.
The Secretary of State is satisfied that you have completed the requisite period in permit free employment and has therefore gone on to consider your application in the light of all the known circumstances. I must therefore inform you that the Secretary of State is satisfied, on the basis of the information he has received from confidential sources, that you are involved with an Islamic terrorist organisation Markaz Dawa al Rishad (MDI). He is satisfied that in the light of your association with the MDI it is undesirable to permit you to remain and that your continued presence in this country represents a danger to national security. In these circumstances, the Secretary of State has decided to refuse your application for indefinite leave to remain in accordance with Paragraph 322(5) of the immigration rules (HC395).

Notice of intention to make a Deportation Order
The Secretary of State has decided that your deportation from the United Kingdom would be conducive to the public good in the interests of national security because of your association with Islamic terrorist groups. Accordingly, he has decided to make a deportation order against you by virtue of Section 3(5)(b) of the Immigration Act 1971, requiring you to leave the United Kingdom and prohibiting you from returning while the order remains in force. He proposes to give directions for your removal to Pakistan, the country of which you are a national or which most recently provided you with a travel document.
By virtue of Section 2(1)(c) of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 you are entitled to appeal against the decision to make a deportation order against you on the grounds that your presence in this country is not conducive to the public good in the interests of national security. At any such appeal hearing the Special Immigration Appeals Commission would be provided with details of the security case against you."

By letter of 17 February 1999 the Secretary of State corrected his previous letter. In that letter he indicated that he had been in error in informing the respondent that he had a right of appeal in relation to the refusal of his application for indefinite leave to remain because the application was out of time and subsequently withdrawn when the respondent travelled out of the United Kingdom in October 1997. The Secretary of State did however reiterate that the respondent had a right of appeal against his decision that the respondent be deported.
The respondent appealled the decision to deport and it was in respect of that appeal that SIAC gave its decision which gives rise to the appeal to this court.

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The Facts
The factual background of this appeal is succinctly summarised by SIAC in its ruling and I gratefully adopt this account.
"The Appellant is a Pakistani national, born on 2 June 1971 in Mian Channu, Pakistan. He is married to Hashmad Bibi by whom he has two children both born in the United Kingdom. The Appellant's father and mother came to the United Kingdom in 1988; both hold British citizenship. His father is a Minister of Religion at the Halifax Mosque, Halifax, Yorkshire.
Other members of his immediate family all live in the United Kingdom. The Appellant matriculated from Rawalpindi Board in Pakistan in 1988. He studied at the Jamiah Salsiah, Islamabad, Pakistan until March 1992, when he was awarded a Masters Degree in Islamic Studies. Thereafter he taught at Jamiah Salsiah until January 1993. The Appellant originally applied to come to the United Kingdom in 1990 as a dependant of his father. However, as he was over the age of 18, his entry clearance application was refused. He was subsequently issued with an entry clearance on 17 January 1993 to enable him to work as a Minister of Religion with the Jamait Ahele-e-Hadith (JAH) in Oldham. He arrived in the United Kingdom on the 9 February 1993. He was subsequently granted further leave to remain until 9 February 1997 in order to complete four years as a Minister. On 3 March 1997, the Appellant made an out-of-time application for indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom. In October 1997, the Appellant was granted leave
to remain until 7 January 1998 to enable him and his family to travel to Pakistan on holiday. On his return to the United Kingdom on 4 December 1997 at Manchester Airport he was detained and was interviewed by Special Branch Officers and seen by an Officer of the Security Service.
By letter dated 9 December 1998 the Appellant's application for indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom was refused."
The appellant gave notice of appeal on 10 December 1998.
For the purpose of the appeal the Secretary of State made an "open" statement of his case in accordance with rule 10(1) of the Rules. I refer to the relevant parts of that statement as amended by counsel for SIAC at the conclusion of the evidence. It alleged that Shafiq Ur Rehman is the United Kingdom point of contact of "Markaz Dawa Al Irshad" ("MDI"). MDI is an Islamic extremist organisation whose mujahidin fighters are known as the "Lashkar Taiyyaba" ("LT"). On MDI's behalf, Ur Rehman has been involved in the recruitment of British Muslims to undergo military training and in fund-raising for LT. Ur Rehman is a personal contact of Mohammad Saeed, the world-wide leader of MDI and LT. It was the security service assessment that Ur Reham's activities directly support a terrorist organisation. The statement continued:
"The Security Service assesses that while Ur Rehman and his United Kingdom based followers are unlikely to carry out any acts of violence in this country, his activities directly support terrorism in the Indian subcontinent and are likely to continue unless he is deported. Ur Rehman has only been partly responsible for an increase in the number of Muslims in the United Kingdom who have undergone some form of military training, including indoctrination into extremist beliefs and at least some basic weapons handling. The Security Service is concerned that the presence of returned jihad trainees in the UK may encourage the radicalisation of the British Muslim community. His activities in the United Kingdom are intended to further the cause of terrorist organisation abroad. For this reason, the Secretary of State considers both that Ur Rehman poses a threat to national security and that he should be deported from the UK on the grounds that his presence here is not conducive to the public good for reasons of national security."
By his grounds of appeal the Appellant denies that JAH, by whom he is employed as a Minister of Religion, is in any way linked to LT. Further he contends:
"The Secretary of State is wrong to assert that the Appellant is the leader of MDI in the United Kingdom. The Appellant did attend the MDI conference in Pakistan and he spoke about the welfare, educational and religious work done by him and the organisation which employs him in the United Kingdom (JAH).
The Secretary of State is wrong to assert that the Appellant has raised funds for the Mujahiden or recruited any British Muslims to undergo any militant training in the Indian sub-continent. The only funds that he has raised were for the purpose of supporting educational and welfare projects in Pakistan. The Appellant is not aware that these funds were used for military operations in the Jihad.
The Appellant's activities in the United Kingdom do not support terrorism in the Indian sub-continent. He had never been involved in any weapons handling. Neither he nor, to his knowledge, any of his supporters have ever been involved in any weapons training or handling...
The Appellant supports the cause of the people of Kashmir but does not and never has supported any terrorist organisation which relies on violence to achieve its aims.
The Secretary of State has misconstrued his powers of deportation on the basis of national security. This should be construed strictly and narrowly.
The Appellant submits that the power to deport is limited to activities which have a direct bearing on the national security of the United Kingdom and not of any foreign government."

The Hearing before SIAC

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SIAC concluded:
"In the circumstances, and for the purposes of this case, we adopt the position that a person may be said to offend against national security if he engages in, promotes, or encourages violent activity which is targeted at the United Kingdom, its system of government or its people. This includes activities directed against the overthrow or destabilisation of a foreign government if that foreign government is likely to take reprisals against the United Kingdom which affect the security of the United Kingdom or of its nationals. National security extends also to situations where United Kingdom citizens are targeted, wherever they may be. This is the definition of national security which should be applied to the issues of fact raised by this appeal." (emphasis added)
SIAC indicated that as to issues of fact, their approach was as follows :

"... we have asked ourselves whether the Secretary of State has satisfied us to a high civil balance of probabilities that the deportation of this Appellant, a lawful resident of the United Kingdom, is made out on public good grounds because he has engaged in conduct that endangers the national security of the United Kingdom and, unless deported, is likely to continue to do so."
Applying the standard of a "high civil balance of probabilities" SIAC reached the following conclusion on the issues of fact :
"1. Recruitment. We are not satisfied that the Appellant has been shown to have recruited British Muslims to undergo militant training as alleged.
2. We are not satisfied that the Appellant has been shown to have engaged in fund-raising for the LT as alleged.
3. We are not satisfied that the Appellant has been shown to have knowingly sponsored individuals for militant training camps as alleged.
4. We are not satisfied that the evidence demonstrates the existence in the United Kingdom of returnees, originally recruited by the Appellant, who during the course of that training overseas have been indoctrinated with extremist beliefs or given weapons training, and who as a result allow them to create a threat to the United Kingdom's national security in the future.
As to the Appellant's activities in sponsoring Pakistanis to enter the United Kingdom by assisting them to make visa applications, we would say only that nothing the Appellant has been proved to have done in this respect could be said to constitute a threat to national security as defined. As for the Respondent's assertion that the Appellant's future behaviour, if he is not deported, is likely to threaten national security, we have heard and seen no evidence that supports such a prediction. Indeed, if anything, the balance of the evidence has been to the opposite effect. In any case, in view of our findings the Appellant has not been proved to have acted in the past in such a way as to cause a threat or damage to national security. We are not satisfied on the evidence that his future behaviour is likely to constitute such a threat or to cause such damage.
We have reached all these conclusions while recognising that it is not disputed that the Appellant has provided sponsorship, information and advice to persons going to Pakistan for the forms of training which may have included militant or extremist training. Whether the Appellant knew of the militant content of such training has not, in our opinion, been satisfactorily established to the required standard by the evidence. Nor have we overlooked the Appellant's statement that he sympathised with the aims of LT in so far as that organisation confronted what he regarded as illegal violence in Kashmir. But, in our opinion, these sentiments do not justify the conclusion contended for by the Respondent. It follows, from these conclusions of fact, that the Respondent has not established that the Appellant was, is, and is likely to be a threat to national security. In our view, that would be the case whether the wider or narrower definition of that term, as identified above, is taken as the test. Accordingly we consider that the Respondent's decisions in question were not in accordance with the law or the Immigration Rules (paragraph 364 of HC 395) and thus we allow these appeals."

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National Security
The correctness of SIAC's approach as to what is capable of being regarded as a threat to national security is the most important issue on this appeal. SIAC acknowledged they were adopting a narrow interpretation. They were influenced in doing so by the alternative grounds set out in s.15(3) of the 1971 Act. The use by SIAC of the word "targeted" clearly indicates that SIAC considered the conduct relied on had to be directed against the United Kingdom. Mr Macdonald initially in his skeleton argument was minded to accept the correctness of SIAC's approach. However, in the course of this hearing and in his oral submissions he accepted that the approach which SIAC adopted was too restrictive.
It cannot be the case that if a course of conduct would adversely reflect on the security of this country, it is not open to the Secretary of State to regard the person's presence in this country as not being conducive to the public good because the target for the conduct is another country. Whatever may have been the position in the past, increasingly the security of one country is dependent upon the security of other countries. That is why this country has entered into numerous alliances. They acknowledge the extent to which this country's security is dependent upon the security of other countries. The establishment of NATO is but a reflection of this reality. An attack on an ally can undermine the security of this country. The evidence before SIAC, by Mr Wrench, a senior civil servant in the Home Office and head of the terrorism and protection unit, in the form of a note, makes the position clear. I refer by way of illustration to three paragraphs of his note in support of what I regard as a justification for a wider approach than that adopted by SIAC:
"Successive Governments in this country have consistently condemned terrorism in all its forms, wherever, whenever and for whatever motive it is committed. The United Kingdom works in a wide range of international fora - including the United Nations, the G8 and the European Union - to encourage collective condemnation of terrorism and effective practical action against it. The direct threat from international terrorism to the United Kingdom, and to British interests in other countries, including the millions of British citizens travelling or working abroad, is one reason for that policy. British citizens have been attacked, taken hostage and murdered by terrorists overseas. The objectives of such terrorists may or may not be to damage the national security of the United Kingdom, but the effect is to harm individuals for whom Her Majesty's Government has a worldwide consular responsibility..."
An important part of the Government's strategy to protect the UK and UK citizens and interests abroad from the terrorist threat is to foster co-operation between states in combating terrorist groups whatever their objectives. The UK can only expect other states to take measures to combat terrorists who target the UK or UK citizens if the UK, for its part, reciprocates by combating terrorists who target states other than the UK. It cannot be predicted when such ties of reciprocity may prove to be critical to protecting national security from, eg, a terrorist bombing campaign. It is therefore essential in the interests of national security that the UK fosters such ties with as many states as possible now, against the day when any of them may be able to act directly to safeguard the UK's security interests (whether by taking measures against terrorists in their own territory, or by providing the UK with intelligence about proposed terrorist activity).
In Lord Lloyd's report on the future need for counter-terrorist legislation published in October 1996 (Cm 3420) he said:
"A country which seeks to protect itself against international terrorism will not succeed if its defences are confined to its own soil. The activities of international terrorists abroad, whether or not British interests are directly affected, are of concern to the Government because Government's policy must be, and is, that the UK should take an active part in securing international co-operation in fighting terrorism." (para. 2.4)
Mr Sales correctly submitted that "national security" is a protean concept, "designed to encompass the many, varied and (it may be) unpredictable ways in which the security of the nation may best be promoted."
Although not binding upon us, we would adopt the approach of Auld LJ on a renewed application for judicial review in Raghbit Singh [1996] Imm AR 507 at p. 511 when he said:
"As to "national security", as Laws J pointed out in his judgment, all sorts of consequences may flow from the very existence of terrorist conspiracies or organisations here, whether or not their outcome is intended to occur abroad. Who knows what equally violent response here this sort of conduct may provoke?"
We would also refer to a short passage in a speech of Lord Mustill in T v The Home Secretary [1996] AC 742 761 F-H where he said:
"Not all refugees were worthy of compassion and support. As Article 1F of the Convention recognised, war criminals and offenders against the laws of nations could properly be sent home to answer for their crimes... Another, and rather different, impulse was also opposed to the universal reception of refugees; namely the acknowledgement that terror as a means of gaining what might loosely be described as political ends posed a danger not only to individual states but also to the community of nations."
At the conclusion of the argument we invited counsel to submit a definition of national security. Mr Macdonald provided the following definition:
"In alleged terrorist cases, a person may be said to be a danger to the United Kingdom's national security if he or she engages in, promotes or encourages violent activity which has, or is likely to have, adverse repercussions on the security of the United Kingdom, its system of government or its people."
We regard this as being a generally helpful approach but it is not conclusive or exhaustive. It first of all recognises that what can be regarded as affecting national security can vary according to the danger being considered. Mr Macdonald wisely confined his definition to cases involving terrorism. We also approve the reference which is made in the definition to there having to be adverse repercussions on the security of this country. The repercussions can be direct or indirect. Mr Macdonald indicated that he considered that the adverse repercussions had to be "likely". We consider that it is sufficient if the adverse repercussions are of a kind which create a risk of adverse repercussions. As long as there is a real possibility of adverse repercussions, then the degree of likelihood only becomes important when the Secretary of State has to weigh up against the risk of adverse repercussions the adverse effect of deportation on the immigrant.
As to the three situations referred to in s.15(3) of the 1971 Act, while it is correct that they are alternatives, there is clearly room for there to be an overlap. Here if there were terrorist activities to which Mr Shafiq Ur Rehman was giving encouragement, which were directed against India's links with Kashmir, then the involvement of individuals coming from this country could damage relations between this country and India. However, the fact that the conduct could have an adverse affect on our relationship with a friendly state does not mean that the activities could not also have national security consequences. The promotion of terrorism against any state is capable of being a threat to our own national security. The Government is perfectly entitled to treat any undermining of its policy to protect this country from international terrorism as being contrary to the security interests of this country.
It follows that the approach of SIAC was flawed in so far as it required the conduct relied on by the Secretary of State to be targeted on this country or its citizens.

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Conduct of the hearing before SIAC
For reasons we have indicated, the appeal will be allowed and remitted to SIAC for re-determination applying the approach indicated in our judgment.
Order:
Appeal Allowed
No orders as to costs – Liberty to apply
Leave to appeal to the House of Lords granted but restricted to the issue of the ambit of National Security
Legal Aid assessment of respondent's costs.